The analysis of game relationship between government and enterprise in industrial poverty alleviation

Yongfei Li, Guoshun Ma

Industrial poverty alleviation is to increase the income of farmers through industrial development. At present, enterprises actively participate in industrial poverty alleviation under the mode of "enterprise + farmer" and have achieved good results. However, due to the different understandings of local governments on poverty alleviation policies and the information asymmetry between the government and enterprises, the poverty alleviation construction failed to achieve the expected goals. Based on the model of industrial poverty alleviation, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic evolution process of local government and poverty alleviation enterprises' strategy selection by establishing replicated dynamic equation, and obtains the evolutionary stable strategy of both sides of the game. The conclusion shows that the choice of local government poverty alleviation methods, the degree of punishment for negative poverty alleviation and the reduction of industrial cost has a direct impact on the development of industrial poverty alleviation, and put forward several suggestions on the sustainable effect of industrial poverty alleviation.

https://dx.doi.org/10.31873/IJEAS.5.8.14